Tactical Lessons From 2010 World Cup

There are always tactical advances during a major event, be it club championships like the UEFA Champions League, continental events like the European Championships, or a World Cup.

This tournament has been no different, and Jonathan Wilson of the Guardian writes of the lessons learned from this 2010 World Cup.

This has been the tournament of 4-2-3-1. The move has been apparent in club football for some time; in fact, it may be that 4-2-3-1 is beginning to be supplanted by variants of 4-3-3 at club level, but international football these days lags behind the club game, and this tournament has confirmed the trend that began to emerge at Euro 2008. Even Michael Owen seems to have noticed, which is surely the tipping point.

Formations, though, are one thing, their employment something else, and what has been noticeable in South Africa has been the vast range of 4-2-3-1s. Spain, when they finally adopted it against Germany, and stopped trying to squeeze Fernando Torres and David Villa into the same side, fiddled with the line of three, pulling Xavi back and pushing Andrés Iniesta and Pedro forward so it almost becomes 4-2-1-3, which seems to be the route club football is taking. It has had very attacking full-backs and has pressed high up the pitch, essentially using the Barcelona formula.

There are those who protest at their lack of goals (no side has reached the final scoring fewer) but they are a classic example of a team that prefers to control the game than to become obsessed by creating chances. Perhaps they at times become mesmerised by their passing, perhaps there is even something attritional about it, wearing opponents down until they make the mistake, but it is beautiful attrition. Those who have protested at the modern Holland, and their supposed betrayal of the heritage of Total Football, which is being painted as the ne plus ultra of attacking football, should perhaps look back at the European Cup finals of 1971-73 when Ajax expressed their mastery by holding the ball for long periods. Frankly, if they ever faced a side who took them on rather than sitting eight men behind the ball, we may see a more overtly attacking Spain.